I. INTRODUCTION
The basic political economy models of legislator voting decisions include constituent interests as major determinants. This is particularly appropriate in models where the economic interests of constituents are directly affected by the legislation. In the large and growing body of empirical research on the political economy of trade policy, constituent interests are typically assumed to derive in large part from the impact that the change in trade patterns would have on the constituents as workers or owners of other factors of production. 1 The political economy of trade models developed over the past 20 years clearly suggest that consumer welfare should matter in legislators' decisions.
2 Unfortunately, data limitations typically prevent researchers from testing whether consumer interests actually matter. 3 In this research, we provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators' trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator's state impacts his or her decision to vote in favor of new free trade agreements.
We believe the level of antitrust enforcement is a suitable measure of consumer preferences. As discussed in Ghosal and Gallo (2001) , there are two commonly cited justifications for antitrust enforcement. First, antitrust laws may be used to correct for deviations from competitive behavior; these corrections increase consumer welfare at the expense of producers with market power. Second, interest groups may lobby for antitrust enforcement to redistribute wealth from one group (producers) to another (consumers).
State attorneys general can file antitrust actions against any firm, regardless of the location of the firm, if they have a legitimate interest in protecting the economic welfare of their constituents. 4 A natural hypothesis to come from the models mentioned above is that states that engage in more antitrust enforcement are doing so because (1) the state has more deviations from anticompetitive behavior and/or (2) the state has a stronger consumer lobby demanding antitrust enforcement. 5 If the latter, this same consumer lobby should be able to influence its elected officials to vote in favor of new trade liberalization efforts that would increase consumer welfare.
In this paper, we explore the extent to which consumer interests matter in U.S.
Congressional votes taken during the 108 th Congress (2003-04) 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The standard economic assumption underlying legislative voting behavior is that representatives are concerned with electoral success (e.g., reelection or election to higher office). As a consequence, the basic model is that representative votes are determined by the economic and ideological interests of the legislator's constituents. 6 Baldwin (1985) identifies constituent factors that would tend to increase legislative support for "protectionist" policies, including the greater the proportion of workers in the congressional district employed by import-sensitive industries and the smaller the proportion of workers in the district employed by export industries. In addition to these constituent characteristics, political factors also are important determinants of support. These include the policy position of the member's political party, the preferences of the President (stronger if from the same political party), the member's congressional leadership, and general support for policies such as income assistance for low-income workers and retaliation against "unfair" trade practices.
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Empirical tests of these theories have been carried out on roll-call votes on several
FTAs. The analysis is generally undertaken on the votes in one of the houses of Congress. Nollen and Iglarsh (1990) examine votes taken by U.S. Senators on an amendment to the the impact of imports on the state. To capture ideological influences, they also include measures of the legislator's political party as well as pro-business and pro-labor ratings.
There is empirical support that legislator votes on trade bills are determined by constituent interests and ideology. Marks (1993) analyzes congressional voting on five amendments to the omnibus trade bills of 1987. Explanatory variables in his models include the employment levels in six "trade-sensitive" industries -textiles, footwear, steel products, machine tools, semiconductors, and autos/automobile parts to account for the impact on affected constituent groups. Kahane (1996) focuses on the votes in the U.S. Senate on the 1991 extension of fasttrack procedures, a precursor to the 1993 congressional vote on the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). His model of Senate votes includes employment data for several industries affected by free trade with Mexico to measure the "winners" and "losers" of the fast-track authority, as well as measures of union membership, political party, and ideological measures. Overall, he finds the larger are the groups identified as losers as a result of fast-track authority in the state, the less likely was the senator to vote for extending the authority. Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2009) expand this analysis by examining the determinants of all fast-track authority votes between 1973 and 2002. They find that congressional votes for this authority depend on the "trade exposure" of the legislator's constituency, as measured by the ratio of employees in export industries to employees in import industries, relative to the U.S. measure of exposure.
Probably the most important FTA, at least as measured by public attention, was NAFTA. Several papers focus on the determinants of the roll-call votes on this bill.
8 Baldwin and Magee (2000) analyze congressional voting on NAFTA, along with votes on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and "most favored nation" (MFN) treatment for China. In addition to measures of union strength, income, and a measure of the legislator's ideology, the authors include employment levels from several industries determined to be "winners" and "losers" of these FTAs. The empirical results from probit models on the votes for these trade measures indicate that employment measures in most of the individual industries, either "winners" or "losers," did not have much of a statistical impact.
Kamdar and Gonzalez (1998) also study U.S. Senate votes on NAFTA and GATT.
They include the output as a share of gross state product of certain industries identified as "winners" (primarily capital intensive industries and the service industry) and "losers" (the "low-skill" industries) as a result of these free trade measures. In addition, they include measures of unemployment change, labor union membership, the number of workers Based on NAAG guidelines, there is strong reason to believe that state antitrust enforcement, even more than federal enforcement, is done in the interest of consumer welfare. As Rose (1994) states, the NAAG Guidelines "identify wealth theory as defining the primary objective of the antitrust laws, i.e. that antitrust's central purpose is to prevent income transfers from consumers to producers." The guidelines minimize the degree to which state attorneys general should consider allocative and productive efficiency enhancements when analyzing the impact of a proposed mergers; instead, mergers are challenged almost entirely on the expected impact on the degree of competition in the market.
It is important to note for the purpose of this paper that state attorneys general can file antitrust actions against any merger, regardless of the location of the firm, if they have a legitimate interest in protecting the economic welfare of their constituents.
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There is a growing literature discussing the relationship between antitrust enforcement and international trade. It is increasingly the case that entry, either from domestic or foreign origins, is considered to be a major determinant of competition in economic markets. A considerable amount of empirical literature in industrial organization has found imports or international pressures measured in other ways (e.g., exchange rate movements) to influence domestic prices and profits. In analyzing the potential exercise of monopoly power in domestic markets, both the academic literature and U.S. antitrust authorities have acknowledged the disciplining role of competition from abroad. This suggests that the discipline of trade liberalization may be viewed by legislators as consistent with antitrust enforcement in promoting well-functioning domestic markets and protecting consumer welfare.
One of the earliest studies addressing the impact of imports on the domestic industry was Esposito and Esposito (1971) . Although their econometric results were quite weak and fragile with respect to model specification, more recent studies (e.g., DeRosa and Goldstein (1981) and DeGhellinck et al. (1988) ) have found similar disciplining impacts of foreign competition. Feinberg (1989a) suggests that imports -especially from developing economies A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so easy that market participants, after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could not profitably maintain a price increase above premerger levels. ….In markets where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry passes these tests of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis.
While the guidelines do not specifically discuss supply from abroad it is understood that this competition is potentially relevant to understanding domestic market competition. It is also clear (from section 1.3 of the Guidelines) that foreign firms either currently selling in the U.S.
market or which could quickly supply the U.S. market in response to price incentives are treated in the same manner as domestic firms in judging the nature of competition.
On the other hand, importers may engage in anticompetitive behavior in the domestic market. Wooton and Zanardi (2005) explore the relationship between antitrust policy and antidumping protection; theoretically both policies are designed to correct for anticompetitive behavior, namely price discrimination and/or predatory pricing, with antitrust legislation used to correct for domestic anticompetitive behavior and antidumping used to correct for these same activities by foreign firms. The authors acknowledge, however, that antidumping policy in its current form has little relationship with price discrimination or predation, instead serving as a substitute for other forms of trade protection. This paper suggests that regional trade agreements should be use improve regional antidumping legislation, and encourage its eventual elimination.
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While much support for antitrust has historically been in terms of a populist anti-"bigbusiness" agenda, the more modern view of antitrust tends to focus on the pro-competitive results expected from enforcement against cartels, big-rigging, large horizontal mergers, and certain monopolistic restrictions. If it is the case that less-restrictive trade policy and more active domestic antitrust enforcement have similar impacts on domestic prices, we should expect legislators to vote in similar ways on the two types of policies. Unfortunately, votes on antitrust issues are quite rare. We argue that a good indication of how a legislator would vote on antitrust issues is the aggressiveness of antitrust enforcement in his/her home state.
We incorporate a measure of this aggressiveness in probit models used to explain the recent Following earlier studies such as Baldwin and Magee (2000) , we assume an economy with industry-specific capital and labor whose income includes rents from industry-specific skills. The reduction in tariffs associated with an FTA will decrease the earnings of capitalowners and workers in import-competing industries, while increasing the earnings of the capital-owners and workers in the export-oriented industries. To capture the expected impact of the FTA on each Congressional member's constituents, we include a number of districtlevel economic variables, as described below.
Members Import-sensitive industries typically employ low-income, less-skilled workers, thus we include several demographic characteristics of the Congressional districts. We would expect the probability that a member would vote in favor of an FTA to increase with the average per capita income in the district. In contrast, the likelihood of voting for an FTA should be lower in districts with a high proportion of unskilled workers, which we measure using the share of the population without a high school diploma and the share with a high school diploma but no college degree. The same unobserved factors may influence both a legislator's support for a particular piece of legislation and the level of antitrust enforcement undertaken by his or her states' attorney general. For example, legislators from districts that are home to many large conglomerates may be less likely to pursue antitrust actions against these firms, but more likely to vote in favor of trade legislation that would benefit these firms. In a simple regression of antitrust enforcement on the legislator's decision to vote in favor of the FTA, the error will be correlated with the independent antitrust variable, thus biasing the results.
To account for the possible correlation in the errors, we estimate the determinants of the decision to vote on all four FTAs and the level of state antitrust enforcement simultaneously using a model proposed in Baldwin and Magee (2000) . 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution, X i is a vector of other variables that influence the legislator's vote, W i is a vector of variables that determine the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator's state, and β, γ, and σ are parameters to be estimated; here σ is the standard deviation of the error in the antitrust enforcement equation.
We estimate the model presented in Equations (1)- (2) Table 2 .
IV. RESULTS
Marginal effects from the system of equations in which we control for the log of the number of antitrust cases filed in the Congressmen's state are presented in Table 3 Singaporean FTAs, they were more likely to vote for the Moroccan FTA. This may reflect differences in the three agreements that would result in differential impacts on low-income, unskilled workers. employment shares are presented in Table 4 . Although few of the estimates are significant for the Australian FTA, the results from the Chilean, Moroccan and Singaporean FTAs suggest that these agreements would clearly have differential impacts across sectors. Results suggest that all three FTAs would benefit the petroleum, plastics and rubber, minerals and transportation sectors in the United States, while harming the textile, chemical and computer and electronic equipment sectors.
Several of the variables included in the antitrust enforcement equation were significant and of the expected sign. As expected larger economies, as measured by gross state product, tend to file more antitrust enforcement actions, as do states with higher unionization levels. Surprisingly, although we expected that states with lower per capita incomes would file more antitrust actions to protect consumers, the opposite is estimated.
States that had large shares of "big" establishments in 1990, as measured by the share that employ more than 250 employees, tended to file fewer antitrust cases. This may reflect a desire to protect big business. Other variables, including the average state unemployment, the average share of the state voting for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, and whether or not the state attorney general was appointed, proved to be insignificant.
Finally, we tested whether consumer preferences, as measured by state antitrust enforcement, have a differential impact in the House when compared to the Senate. This is of particular concern due to the fact that our antitrust enforcement variable is a state-wide measure rather than specific to the Congressman's legislative district. The results are presented in Table 5 .
There is little qualitative difference in the results of the House of Representatives subsample when compared to the full model. Antitrust enforcement again has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of voting for FTAs, suggesting that consumer preferences have a significant influence on legislative decisions. Marginal effects suggest that a one percent increase in the level of antitrust enforcement results in a 1.7 to 10.9
percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting for a particular FTA. Estimates associated with the other control variables are also remarkably similar to those from the full sample.
V. CONCLUSION
The aggressiveness of enforcement of state and federal antitrust statutes by state attorneys general is an indicator of the sentiment within that state in favor of consumer interests. As such, it would be expected that this sentiment would also be expressed by the state's Congressional delegation in their votes on free trade agreements -which are also widely viewed as pro-competition and hence, pro-consumer. This study is the first to examine this issue. We find evidence that increased state antitrust enforcement is associated with greater support for negotiated free trade agreements, especially for members of the U.S.
House of Representatives.
FOOTNOTES
1 For example, the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that U.S. legislators from districts with a large proportion of the relatively scarce factor of production, low-skilled workers, will tend to vote against new trade liberalization efforts. Specific factors models of trade predict that legislators from districts with a large number of employees in import-sensitive industries will tend to vote against new trade liberalization efforts.
2 Hillman (1982) postulates that legislators trade off political support from industry interests with the dissatisfaction of consumers; legislators in Grossman and Helpman's (1994) model maximize a weighted function of political contributions and aggregate social welfare. In both models the level of protection is predicted to fall with the sector's elasticity of import demand because there would be a greater loss of consumer surplus with an increase in the level of protection.
reported here, we attempt to eliminate this possibility by creating a new variable focusing on the subset of antitrust actions that are most likely to benefit consumers; results are not qualitatively different. 6 An alternative framework is that policymakers are motivated by larger social goals which may lead them to support policies that run counter to the interests of a majority of voters. Baldwin (1985) explains that this type of behavior best describes the President and not legislators, who are less likely to be able to take a "national" policy view and more likely to be responsive to focused local interest groups. 14 Similarly, Feinberg (1989b) provides evidence suggestive of exchange rate impacts on domestic prices being limited by non-tariff barriers to trade.
15 Of the four free trade agreements considered in this research, only the Chilean free trade agreement includes specific regulations governing the use of antidumping duties. Thus we do not believe that antidumping reform was a major consideration of Congressmen when they were deciding whether or not to vote in favor of the FTAs included in our sample. 16 This measure also has the advantage of being more clearly exogenous -in this sense it might be viewed as an instrument for the more endogenously determined vote on a (hypothetical) antitrust matter. 17 To the extent that voters preferences are themselves influenced by legislative votes taken (along with, perhaps, an explanation for these votes), there may be an endogeneity issue.
However, we deal with this through our equation instrumenting for antitrust enforcement, our proxy for constituent preferences.
18 Of course, as we acknowledged earlier, some antitrust actions may instead reflect a bias against large corporations; this suggests that ultimately the relationship between antitrust sentiment and support for free trade agreements is an empirical question. If larger firms are more likely to export (as has been found empirically), they may have interests in common with consumers in supporting FTAs, which could lead to legislators both favoring antitrust and these trade agreements.
19 Of the case filings incorporated in our index of state antitrust enforcement, more than half involved aspects of bid-rigging, horizontal restraints, price-fixing, or market allocation agreements; these cases all would be likely viewed as promoting competition. A wide range of products is involved in these cases (everything from funeral services to gasoline retailers to school milk contracts). 20 We estimated the number of employees in Congressional Districts by allocating county employment to various districts using the percentage of the county residing in each Table 3 . Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate those parameters significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of constant term and industry employment shares not reported. ***, **, * indicate those parameters significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
